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The Marginal  External  Cost of  Car ~se' 
- with an Application  to Belgium  - 
Road space is  a valuable  and increasingly  scarce resource. There- 
fore it  is  argued by  economists that its use  should be rationed  by 
price. In order to induce road users to make the correct decisions 
about whether  and by  which  mode to make  a particular journey, 
they should be charged  the marginal  social cost of  using  the road 
network. Due to the existence of  negative externalities, this margi- 
nal social cost may differ from the marginal private cost paid by the 
road users. Marginal external costs are costs caused by  the additio- 
nal use of  the road network which are not borne by  the additional 
road user himself but by  others: the other road users or society in 
general. 
The aim of  this paper is to develop a quantitative measure of  the 
marginal  external costs  associated  with  passenger  car  use  in  Bel- 
gium. It concentrates on  three main external cost categories : envi- 
ronmental costs, congestion  costs  and accident  costs.  Several  ele- 
ments for the monetary valuation of  the marginal external costs of 
the different transport modes for Belgium were discussed by  Blau- 
wens  (1991)  and in  the Mobilis  report  (Febiac  (1992)).  However, 
except for the marginal congestion  costs, no  concrete values  were 
derived. Concrete monetary values of  the marginal external costs of 
road transport in the UK were estimated by Newbery ((1987), (1988), 
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expected them to be only a small proportion of  total marginal exter- 
nal  costs.  This is  one of  the aspects which will  be investigated in 
detail in this paper. An alternative to Wewbery's derivation of  mar- 
ginal accident externalities is found in Jones-Lee (1990). 
The structure of  this  paper is  as follows. In section I1 a simple 
theoretical model is presented which illustrates how the total costs 
per km associated with a given traffic flow change as a result of  an 
additional passenger car km.  Section  111 then discusses the mone- 
tary valuation  of  the external costs  caused by  this  additional  pas- 
senger car km  for the particular case of  Belgium. We conclude by 
some warnings about the potential use of  the results in policy for- 
mulation. 
11.  A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Consider the following initial situation. Traffic flow consists of q pas- 
senger car  equivalent  units  (PCU) per hour. In  order to keep the 
analysis simple, the model assumes there are only two types of vehi- 
cles : passenger cars (PC) and trucks (T). The model can readily be 
extended to include other vehicle types. A truck is assumed to cor- 
respond with y PCU. This reflects the difference in congestive effect 
between trucks and passenger cars. The proportion of  passenger cars 
in the traffic flow is given by  X.  (l-x) then represents the proportion 
of  truclts. 
The total number of  trucks is given by 
(1-X)  4  T  =  .- 
Y 
(1) 
Total costs per km corresponding with traffic flow q are given by the 
sum of  four components : total private user costs (C), total environ- 
mental  costs  (E), total  accident  costs (A)  and total road  mainte- 
nance and infrastructure costs (I). 
In the further theoretical discussion it is assumed that all cars and 
their occupants are identical. The same assumption is made for trucks. 
Then private user costs per km for a traffic flow q are given by 
where 
226 ti(s):  time costs per km of  vehicle type i (i =PC,T) 
u,(s,r): vehicle operating costs per km of vehicle type i (excl. of taxes) 
It is  assumed that both ti and ui depend on speed S  (expressed in 
kmlh). Speed is determined by  the so-called speed-flow relationship 
Moreover, U, is assumed to depend on r, the state of  the road which 
is defined as a function of  the number of  trucks and of  a number of 
other factors f. 
The environmental costs per km are defined as 
where 
piis): pollution costs per km of  vehicle type i 
Accident costs are 
where : 
a,:  risk that an accident of  type j  happens to a passenger car (j = 
fatal accident, serious injury, light  injury, material damage); a, 
depends on the speed at which  the traffic  flow moves  (S), on 
traffic  flow  (q), on traffic  composition  (X), on  the number  of 
pedestrians and cyclists (N) and on a number  of  other factors 
(h) 
d,:  risk that an accident of  type j  happens to a truck bj:  risk that an accident of  type j  happens to a pedestrian or a cy- 
clist 
vj:  monetary valuation of  an accident of  type j  happening to an oc- 
cupant of  a passenger  car 
ej:  monetary valuation of  an accident of type j happening to a truck 
wj: monetary valuation of  an accident of  type j  happening to a pe- 
destrian or a cyclist 
z :  average occupancy rate of  a passenger  car 
Road infrastructure and maintenance costs are defined  as 
where : 
m(r):  road maintenance cost per km, a function of  the state of  the 
road 
o(1):  road operating costs per lun  which are assumed to be inde- 
pendent of  traffic flow and to depend on a number of  other 
factors (1) 
So, it is assumed that road maintenance and operating costs are in- 
dependent of  the number of  passenger cars. This assumption is ba- 
sed on Newbery  (1990). 
If  an additional passenger  car drives a km  on the road, total costs 
will  change as follows (using 6q l 6PC = 1) 
du. 
a,VJ+PCZC  __VJ 
j  dPC 
dd,  dh.  -e  +NI  LW 
dPC  '  dPC  ' 
where Similar expressions hold for db, IdPC and ddj IdPC. From equa- 
tion  (9) it  is  clear that a change  in the number of  passenger  cars 
may  influence accident risks in  several ways: through  its effect  on 
the speed at which the traffic flow moves, through its effect on the 
number of  passenger car units and through its effect on traffic com- 
position. 
Equation (S)  shows that if  an additional passenger car drives one 
ltrn, this has several impacts on total costs. These impacts and their 
description are summarized in  Table 1. For each of  the effects the 
table also describes who bears the costs. Not all marginal cost cate- 
gories presented in  Table 1 are external. Category  (a) belongs  to 
tile private costs of  the driver and passengers of  the additional car 
and will  therefore not be discussed  any further in this paper. 
n  rart  of r*ai-giiiai  - --:  ilcctdent costs  (c), (fj and (g) are cwered by  the 
insurance contract of  the driver of  the additional car and thus can- 
not be considered as an external cost. This aspect will be discussed 
in  a more detailed way  in  a later section of  this paper. The other 
marginal cost categories can be considered as external. Together with 
the external part of  the marginal accident costs they constitute the 
total marginal  external  cost  associated  with  an additional car-km. 
Part I11 ciiscusses the monetary valuation of  these different catego- 
ries of  marginal external costs for the case of  Belgium. 
111.  THE MONETARY VALUATION OF THE EXTERNAL 
COSTS OF AN ADDITIONAL PASSENGER CAR KM 
The external costs of  an additional passenger car km are calculated 
for thrce different road types and different levels of  congestion. The 
road types considered are : urban roads, highways and other roads. 
For urban and "other" roads traffic is assumed to be composed of 
three vehicle types: cars, buses and trucks. In the case of  highways 
only  two vehicle  types  are considered : passenger  cars  and truclts. 
Table 2 sum~narizes  for each road typc the different levels of congcs- 
tion considered and the basic  assumptions on traffic composition. 
A. Malginal congestiorz costs 
In road transport marginal congestion costs take place whenever an 
additional vehicle on the road slows down the others. As was shown 
in  the theoretical model, slower speed has several effects. First  of 
all, it  influeilces time and operating costs of  the other road  users. Secondly, it also has an impact on environmental costs and accident 
risks. This section will only cover the first two effects. The monetary 
valuation of  the latter two effects will be discussed in sections II1.B 
and 1II.C. 
For the calculation of  the marginal congestion costs it is assumed 
that congestion  does not  influence the demand of  the other road 
users. The marginal congestion costs we discuss here are thus short- 
TABLE 1 
Total mnrgznal costs arsoclated wzth  an nddztlonnl  cnr km 
d  6  6p  Js)   PAS)  2  i PC P  +  T  ) 
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additional car 
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friends 
Society TABLE l (continued) 
Totrrl  margiiznl  costs associated  with ail  additional car kin 
the increased risk of 
occupants of other 
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TABLE 2 
Cases considered  in the einpil.icnl  exercise for Belgium 
Level of congestion 
share of different run in  naturei. They consist  of  the costs imposed  on other traffic 
assuming no rcsponse from other road users. 
Central in the calculation of  the marginal congestion costs is the 
speed-flow relationship which describes how average speed (S)  is in- 
fluenced by  traffic  flow  (q). Traffic flow is  measured in passenger 
car units (PCU) per hour. PCU are used instead of  the number of 
vehicles to rcflect  the difference in congestive effect  of  the vehiclc 
types considered. A bus or a trucl< are assumed to correspond with 
2 PCU. 
For our analysis we  assume that the following speed-flow relation- 
ships hold : 
ROAD TYPE  1  SPEED-FLOW RELATIONSHIP 
Other road  S  = 74.5 
(2x1 lanes)  S  = 74.5-0.00975*(q-300) 
Blauwens  (1991) points out that one can only use spced-flow rela- 
tionships to calculate marginal external congestion costs if  traffic is 
still moving and has not come to a complete standstill. According to 
him, the latter case requires  a different method based on the me- 
thod used in  the case  of  waiting lines  at  airports, sluices  or ferry 
services. This method seems to be appropriate  when looking at conges- 
tion problems at differcnt points in  the network separately. If  one 
lool<s at the congestion problem in a more integrated way, then the 
speed-flow relationship  should reflect in  some way the relationship 
between  average speed from origin to destination of  a trip and the 
relevant  traffic  flow  (Newbery  (1988)). In that case  one does not 
have to treat stationary traffic in a separate way: its effect on speed 
and time costs is already incorporated through the average speed. It 
is  the latter approach which is chosen in  this paper. l. Time costs 
The speed-flow relationships allow us to calculate the time loss suf- 
fered by the othcr road users if  an additional passenger car joins the 
traffic flow. In order to express this time loss in monetary terms, we 
base  ourselves on recent value of  time (VOT) studies for the Ne- 
therlands. Such studies exist both for  passenger  and freight trans- 
port. 
For passenger transport, a  willing~less-to-pay  (WTP) study  car- 
ried out for the Netherlands by  the Hague Consulting Group (1990) 
provides  empirical evidence about money valuations of  travel time 
savings 01  losses by  travellers using  private  cars  and public  trans- 
port. 'Fhe methodology uscd  and the results obtained are discussed 
extensively by I-Iague Consulting Group (1990) and Bradley and Gunn 
(1991). Table 3 suminarizes the representative time-weighted ave- 
rage VOT which were obtained for car drivers and users of  public 
transport. We will use these results as a first approximation in  our 
analysis for Belgium. The values refer to in-vehicle time. A distinc- 
tion is made between three journey  purposes : business, commuting 
and other motives. The results were derived  on the basis of  stated 
prefcrencc  information : travellers were  interviewed  to elicit  their 
preferences concerning possible but hypothetical travel options which 
differed in terms of  travel time and costs. For the business motive, 
the VOT derived from the stated preference study only reflects the 
value to the worker himself and not to the employer. Therefore the 
stated preference  figure is increased with  the employer's value  of 
business travel (Bradley and Gunn (1991)). The total value thus obtai- 
ned is presented  in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 










/  VALUE OF TIME (BF 1989lhour)  1 The results of  HCG must be combined with data on the importance 
of  the three trip motives. It can be expected that their importance 
will  not be the same for  the two transport modes, the three road 
types and the different levels of  congestion considered. Data on the 
percentage of  total vehicle-km devoted to commuting, business and 
other purposes as given by  De Borger  (1987) do not entirely serve 
our purpose. For city  traffic we  have  based  ourselves on data for 
Brussels provided by Stratec (1992). For traffic on highways and other 
roads we do not dispose at this moment of  similar information. As 
a first approximation we therefore formulate hypotheses on the im- 
portance of  the trip motives on these two road types. Of course this 
approach needs to be changed when better data become available. 
The calculation of  the marginal external time costs also requires 
.  . 
dab  on the average vehicle occupancy :ate.  I==r passenger cars it is 
assumed that this rate is 1.2 in the case of  commuting and business 
travel. For other journey purposes an average vehicle occupancy rate 
of  1.8 is assumed. These values are close to the ones put forward by 
the British Department of  Transport in its COBA-9 manual (Great 
Britain, Department of  Transport (1987)). For buses average vehi- 
cle occupancy rates of  37 and 15 are assumed for respectively peak 
and off-peak period. The former is based on Small (1983). 
The VOT in freight transport can be estimated by  means of  se- 
veral methods. A brief  overview is  given in De Jong et al. (1992). 
We will  limit ourselves here to the discussion of  two VOT studies 
for freight transport. Blauwens and Van de Voorde (1988) estimate 
the VOT in freight transport by means of  an aggregate revealed pre- 
ference model. They consider the particular case of  competition bet- 
ween  road  haulage  and inland  navigation.  The modal  choice  is  a 
function of  the difference in time between the two transport modes 
as well of  the difference in costs. Estimating an econometric func- 
tion which describes this relationship yields that in the commodity 
transportation  sector  the value of  one hour is  equal to 0.0000848 
times the value of  the goods transported. The VOT is thus found to 
be proportional to the value of  the goods. 
In De Jong et al. (1992) short and medium term VOT in freight 
transport are estimated by means of  the contextual stated preferen- 
ce method. The study concerns all freight transport in the Nether- 
lands using  the modes  road, rail  and inland waterways.  For road 
transport different  good  categories  were  considered. Respondents 
were asked  to  choose between  different alternatives  for  a  typical transport they were involved in. The choice alternatives were within- 
mode and differed with respect to five characteristics : transport costs, 
travel  time,  travel  time  reliability,  probability  of  damage  and fre- 
quency of  shipment. The authors estimated the effect of  a percen- 
tage change in each of these characteristics on the respondent's uti- 
lity. By  applying the ratio between the time and the cost coefficient 
to the hourly transport cost, estimates for the VOT were obtained. 
The results  are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 





Road : average 
Hourly transport  1  Trade-off ratio  1 





1159  0.826 
1130  0.936  1058 
Goods categories : 
A:  low value raw materials and semi-finished goods 
B:  high value raw materials and semi-finished goods 
C :  finished goods with loss of  value 
D :  finished goods without loss of  value 
It is found that the VOT for transporting raw materials  and semi- 
finished goods is higher  than the value for finished products.  The 
authors explain this by the fact that raw materials and semi-finished 
goods need further processing. Delays during transport may lead to 
delays in the production process, with all subsequent costs. The VOT 
is higher for finished products with potential loss of  value than for 
finished products without loss of  value. 
In the empirical  exercise, we  use  the results  of  De Jong et al. 
Since we  do not yet  dispose of  data concerning the importance of 
the four  different  goods  categories, we  use  the average value  for 
goods transport by  road. 
2. Operating costs 
Slowing down  other vehicles  also has  an effect on their operating 
costs. In this paper we will approximate this effect by  the change in 
fuel costs. In order to do so we  need information  on the relation- ship between  fuel consumption  and speed. For gasoline  passenger 
cars detailed information on this relationship is found in Zierock et 
al. (1989). However we do not dispose of such detailed data for pas- 
senger cars running on diesel or LPG or for trucks. The effect on 
their operating costs is therefore not yet considered in this analysis. 
3. Results 
Table 5  piesents the total  short-run  marginal  congestion  costs  as 
they  are calculated  based  on the assumptions  put foi~vard  in  this 
section. It can be observed that they consist mainly of  marginal ex- 
ternal time costs. For some traffic conditions, the marginal external 
file1 costs are negative, reflecting the fact that in those cases a de- 
crease in  speed is  accompanied by  a decrease in  fuel consumption. 
TL  l~e  importaiice of  the marginal externai fuel cos-cs, which act as a 
proxy for the marginal external vehicle operating costs, is  only mi- 
nor. Pi should be noted however that the estimation procedure for 
these costs only takes into account the effect on the fuel costs of 
gasoline cars. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the importance 
of  the marginal fuel costs will remaln small even if  the effect on the 
fuel costs of  other vehicle types is incorporated. Furthermore, it is 
expected that the inclusion of  other non-fuel vehicle operating costs 
will not change this conclusion. 
The level of  the marginal  external time  costs  is  shown  to vary 
widely  according to  the road  type  and the level  of  congestion. It 
ranges from BF 0 in the cases without congestion to approximately 
BF 74 in the case of  heavy congestion on highways. In peak circum- 
stances on urban and "other" roads a value of  resp. BF 12.8 and BF 
4.40 is obtained. The results glven in  Table 5  are only valid under 
the assumptions put forward in the previous  paragraphs. They de- 
pend heavily on the assumed traffic composition  and on the impor- 
tance of  the different journey  purposes for passenger  cars. For in- 
stance, ii one assumes in the case of  heavy congestion on highways 
that 80% of  passenger cars are used for "other" purposes and only 
10% for business purposes and commuting each, then the marginal 
external time costs decrease from approximately BF 74  to around 
BF 66. New traffic flow 
lnitlal speed (kmlh) 
New speed (kmlh) 
Journey purpose passenger cars: 
MARGINAL EXTERNAL TIME COSTS 
T~me!oss  per vehicle (min) 1. The marginal external air pollution  costs 
associated with car use 
In the empirical exercise we will limit ourselves to the air pollution 
problems associated with NO,,  SO,,  HC and CO,.  Due to a lack of 
information, lead, CO and particulates  could  not yet  be  incorpo- 
rated. In order to estimate the marginal social  air pollution  costs 
associated with  an additional car  km,  two  major  steps have  to be 
undertaken : the determination of  the effect on emissions of  an ad- 
ditional car-km and the monetary valuation of  this change in emis- 
sions. 
a. The effect on emissions of  an additional car-km 
The first step consists of  determining how the emission of  the dif- 
ferent air pollutants changes as  a result  of  the additional car-km. 
We will limit ourselves to the emission of  SO,,  CO,,  HC and NO,. 
As was  shown in  the theoretical model  of  section  11,  we  have  to 
make a distinction between the direct and the indirect effect on emis- 
sions. First of  all, the additional car-km driven at a given speed will 
emit itself  a volume of  air pollutants. Secondly, by  influencing the 
speed of  the other road users, it will have an impact on the volume 
of  their emissions. 
In order to derive both the direct and the indirect effect on emis- 
sions, information is needed on the volume of the air pollutants emit- 
ted by  individual vehicles. This information is found in  a study by 
the Corinair working group on emission  factors for road traffic in 
which  a set of  emission factors were  proposed  to be used  for the 
1985 Corinair emission inventory (Zierock et al. (1989)). It presents 
a.0. emission factors for NO,  and HC (incl. methane). A distinction 
is made between  three types of  emissions. The first type  are "hot 
emissions" which are emitted by vehicles after they have warmed up 
to their normal operating temperature. The second type  are "cold 
emissions" which  are emitted while  the vehicles  are warming  up. 
The third  type  are evaporative emissions  and occur  only  for  HC. 
Eight  different vehicle  types  are considered. Emission factors are 
given  in  function of  speed or, if  such  detailed  information  is  not 
available, for three dBerent road types. For gasoline vehicles <3.5  t, 
the study also takes into account the age of  the vehicle and the le- 
gislation  to which it conforms. Zierock et al. also give information on the fuel consumption per km. This allows us to compute the change 
in SO, and CO, emissions due to an additional vehicle-km, for which 
the Corinair working group gives no data. Information on the emis- 
sions of  SO,  and CO,  in function of  fuel consumption are presented 
in  a study by  Econotec (1990). 
Having  determined on the basis  of  the speed-flow relationship 
how fast the additional car is  driving, this information  is  sufficient 
to compute the direct emissions associated with the additional car- 
km, if  we  know the vehicle  characteristics. For some vehicle  types 
we  do not have information on the speed-emission relationship. In 
that case emissions per km are determined on the basis of  the road 
type. 
At this moment, the indirect effect on the emissions by the other 
vehicles can oniy be caiculateci for gasoline passenger cars. For the 
other vehicle  types  the relationship  between  speed  and fuel  con- 
sumption or emissions is not available. 
Adding the direct  and the indirect  effect, we  obtain the overall 
effect on emissions due to an additional vehicle-km. This overall ef- 
fect is not necessarily larger than the direct effect, since the indirect 
effect of  the additional car-km will  not necessarily  be  to increase 
total traffic emissions. It is possible that a decrease in speed leads 
to a decrease in emissions. In that case the indirect effect will par- 
tially offset the direct effect. Both the direct and the indirect effect 
depend on the characteristics of  the different vehicles concerned and 
on the speed at which or the type of  road on which they are driving. 
Therefore it is clear that it will be impossible to speak of 'the' mar- 
ginal social air pollution cost. 
b.  The monetary valuation of  the change in emissions 
After computing the change in emissions, it has to be given a mone- 
tary value. Ideally, this would  involve the determination of  the ef- 
fect of  the change in  emissions  on the concentration levels of  the 
different primary and secondary air pollutants  concerned. In order 
to obtain this information, one needs dispersion models which pre- 
dict the spread of  pollutants from their origin (the vehicle) and trans- 
formation models which describe how different pollutants can react 
together to form so-called secondary air pollutants. For some pollu- 
tants these models will be relatively simple, for others they will be 
extremely complex. But in either case it  can generally be said that the scientific literature cannot provide us yet with the required mo- 
dels. In the imaginaiy case in which this problem would not exist, 
the next step would consist of  establishing the effects of  the concen- 
trations measured in  the air and the extent to which the pollution 
caused by  the additional vehicle-km aggravates these effects. In the 
literature the effects of  the different air pollutants - as they are known 
today - are discussed extensively. However, quantitative expressions 
which relate different kinds of  air pollution to their effects are less 
generally available. The effect  of  an  additional vehicle-km  is  even 
more difficult to establish. Finally, one has to put a monetary value 
on the effects of  air pollution and more specifically on the marginal 
effect caused by  the additional vehicle-km. Less problems  arise at 
this stage. The economic literature on the monetary valuation of  air 
pdlation effects is relatively well deve!~ped. Hewever, c~mp!etc  ap- 
plications for Belgium or other countries are not yet available. More- 
over there is  no guarantee that the results for other countries can 
be carried over to Belgium. Finally, the different methods which have 
been applied yield varying results. 
The difficulties encountered in the different stages make it clear 
that the procedure described cannot easily be put into practice. There- 
fore, instead of  estimating the social marginal air pollution costs in 
a direct way, we will  use  alternative,  indirect approaches to put a 
monetary value on the extra emissions caused by  an additional vehi- 
cle-km. Two different approaches are proposed: one for the mone- 
tary valuation of  NO,,  SO,  and HC emissions and one for the valua- 
tion of  CO,  emissions. The difference in approach is mainly explai- 
ned by  a  difference in the available data. 
For NO,,  SO,  and HC the monetary valuation  approach which 
we propose to use is described in a detailed way in Mayeres (1992). 
In this  paper we will limit ourselves to a general discussion of  the 
method. The approach starts by  putting forward emission reduction 
objectives for the different air pollutants, based on existing interna- 
tional  agreements to which Belgium has  adhered. It is then calcu- 
lated at what  costs the required emission reductions can be achie- 
ved  in  the initial  situation, i.e. the situation before  the change in 
vehicle-km takes place. In order to do so one needs information on 
the different emission  abatement  techniques, their  abatement  po- 
tential  and their unit reduction costs. This information is  used  to 
consiruct marginal abatement cost curves after ranlung the best avai- 
lable  control technologies  on the basis  of  their  cost-effectiveness. Applying  the cost  data to the initial  emissions  in  1989, it  can  be 
calculated how  and at what  cost the required emission  abatement 
can be realized. 
The next step consists of  analyzing the consequences of  the chan- 
ge in emissioils due to the additional car-km. If  the emissions of  the 
transport sector arc larger than in the initial situation, emissions have 
to decrease elsewhere in order to reach the internationally  agreed 
objective in the new situation. The social cost of  the emissions cau- 
sed by  thc additional car-km is then set equal to the costs of  achie- 
ving this emission reduction. If  en~issions  havc decreased with res- 
pect  to the initial  situation, there is  no longer  a social cost but  a 
social benefit which  is  set equal to the cost  savings which  can be 
realized when  trying to reach the total emission target in  the new 
5iiuatioii. The decrease in  emissi~ns  entails th2t i11  order to rea!ize 
the objective, less effort is needed to decrease emissions elsewhere. 
The approach makes a number of  important assumptions. First of 
all, it  assumes that the emission reductions take place in a cost-ef- 
fective way, i.e. the cheapest technologies  arc applied first. There- 
fore, as total emissions increase higher social marginal costs will be 
associated  with  additional emission units.  Secondly, it  is  assumed 
that there are no indivisibilities in the emission abatement possibi- 
lities. Thii-dly, the marginal social costs will  depend heavily on the 
objective which is put folward. The less restrictive this objective, i.e. 
the more easily it  can be reached, the lower will  be the marginal 
social costs. Finally, the method  assumes that the damage associa- 
ted with  the different  air pollutants  is the same no matter where 
and when they are emitted. 
For CO,  the energy-carbon tax of  $10 per barrel of  oil which has 
recently been proposed by  the EC, is  interpreted  as the marginal 
willingness to pay of  the EC for decreases in CO,  emissions. A so- 
cial cost of  10$ per barrel corresponds to approximately 725 BF per 
tonne CO,  in 1989 prices. This figure can then be used to calculate 
the social costs of  the extra CO,  emissions caused by  an additional 
vehicle-kin. 
c. Results 
Applying the two methods described to quantify the marginal social 
air pollution  costs of  car use, yields the results which are summa- 
rized  in  Table 6. The findings refer  to the sum of  the direct and indirect effect  on air pollution of  the additional car-km. For their 
interpretation one needs to  bear in  mind  the various assumptions 
which were put forward in the previous paragraphs. The values obtai- 
ned for the total effect depend on the fuel type, the age  and the 
cylinder  capacity of  the car which  drives  the additional km. In  all 
cases the highest values are obtained when the additional km is dri- 
ven by  a gasoline car. The lowest  costs are associated with  diesel 
cars5. For almost all  traffic conditions  considered  the marginal ex- 
ternal air pollution  costs are smaller than %F 1. For heavy conges- 
tion  on urban roads and highways they are somewhat higher. 
2.  The marginal external noise costs associated 
with car use 
a. The effect on noise of  an additional car-km 
In order to calculate the marginal external noise costs, it needs to 
be determined what is the effect on the noise level of  an additional 
car-km. According to Lamure (1990), L,,(~B(A))~  can be expressed 
approximately as : 
Llq(dB(A))  = 20  log s - 10 log  d  +  10 log  q  + constant  (10) 
where : 
s : speed (kmlh) 
d :distance from the infrastructure (m) 
q :traffic flow (PCUlh) 
In  this  equation, it  is  assumed  that in  terms  of  their  effect  on 
noise, trucks and buses are equivalent to 10 cars (Lamure (1990)). 
From  equation  (10)  it  is  clear  that  an additional PCU  will  affect 
Leq(dB(A)) both directly and indirectly (through its influence on S). 
For a given distance from the infrastructure this formula allows us 
to compute the marginal change in the noise level due to an addi- 
tional PCU. The total effect on noise is not necessarily larger than 
the direct effect and can even become negative. In the cases where 
an increase in q decreases speed, the decrease in speed will partially 
or completely offset the direct effect of  the increase in q. If  it more 
than offsets the direct effect, the total effect becomes negative. URBAN  HIGHWAY  OTHER 
Otfpeak  Peak  No  Lcght  Medium  Heavy  No  Light  Heavy 
congestion  congest~on  conqestion  congestion  congestion  congestion  conge~tlan 
lnltiill traffic (low  210  472.5  1375  31215  4500  5625  180  460  2040 
New tianlc flow  211  473.5  1376  31213  4501  5626  181  461  2041 
lnllal sped  (kmlh)  38 375  29.1675  115  1105475  76.792  36 2245  74.5  72.745  57.535 
New speed (km&)  38 375  28.1525  11 5  110 54476  76.75594  36 18844  74.5  72.73525  57.52525 
TOTAL MARGINAL EXTERNAL  AIR POLLUFION 
COSTS (BF 19891Car-km) IF  THE ADDITIONAL 
KM IS  DRIVEN BY A CAR OFTYPE 
Gasaline  -P  car 
PRE-EEC  cc C 14  0 6086  1.0142  05675  0.5466  0.4461  1.4660  0 6033  0.6037  0 6607 
1.4  c cc c 2  0.6626  1.0697  0.7270  0.6967  0.5366  1.5201  0.6939  0 6891  0.7227 
cc,2  0.9485  1.1567  0.6952  0.8586  0.6551  1.6056  0.8066  0.8026  0.8174 
7012201EEC  cc < 1.4  0.6954  0.8829  0.5066  0.4680  0.3707  1.3492  0.5244  0.5221  0.5508 
& 7412901EEC  1 4 <cc < 2  0.7447  0.9346  0.6600  0.6315  0.4533  1.3966  0.6028  05973  0.6072 
cc>2  0.8055  0.9935  0.9226  0.6793  0.6037  1.4585  07477  0.7378  0.6815 
771102lEEC  cc c 1.4  0.6666  0.8703  0.7052  0.6596  0.4040  1.3391  0.5515  05445  0.5933 
1.4cccc2  0.7260  0.9165  0.7656  0.7185  0.4460  1.3797  0.5922  05842  0.6235 
cc>2  0.7789  0.9772  0.8368  0.7863  0.5018  1.4340  0.6479  0.6400  0.6820 
cc>2 
LPG car  -- - 
NOTE: The calculabon of he  manglml  exlernal air pollution  mstr uses Ik following moneery values pr  g emisdon: 
h  >!ant  Money  im  sron red-coon oqocbve wh cn 
value  PC  q  esal m3  OBS  S 01  tno rnnn,Ov  val~u 
0.086  Reduction  of NOx emisdons by 30% w.r.L  1980 
(objective  &pled  by Belgium  additiond to Sofia Pmtoml) 
0.1826  Reductionof HCemissbns bf 30% w.r.L  1987 
[Geneva Pmtoml) 
0.013  Reduction  of S02 emissions  by 30% wr.t 1980  1  1  (Helsinki  Pmtoml) WTP of  individuals  for peace  and quiet  (Alexandre and Barde 
(1987)). The hedonic prices approach, which is a variant of  the sur- 
rogate  markct  approach, is  the most  widely  used  method  for  the 
evaluation of  the social costs of noise. The basic idea underlying this 
technique is that the value of  a house depends not only on its intrin- 
sic characteristics, but  is  also  a  function of  a number  of  environ- 
mental  attributes, such as accessibility, proximity to schools, shops 
and parks and pollution. If  the value of  a house is  amongst other 
factors a function of  noise, this means that when individuals buy or 
rent  a house, they  have  the possibility within  their price  range of 
buying a property in  a quiet location rather than a similar property 
in  a noisy location. It is  reasonable to expect that - ceteris paribus 
- houses located in noisy areas are of  less value than those located 
ii; *ict  Therefore the housing -  -'--A  ---"L  IIM~KGL  cu~~b~~~utes  a surrugait: 
market for noise (Pearce and Markandya  (1939)). 
The hedonic prices approach is based on a number of  underlying 
assumptions, which can be criticized. The first assumption is that of 
consumer's sovereignty. Individuals  are supposed to have the possi- 
bility of  buying more  or less quiet on the housing market. But in 
reality, a lot of financial, social and cultural constraints prevent people 
from changing houses and location. Moreover, it is not known how 
far people are aware of  the effects of  noise. Therefore it is possible 
that their behaviour does not fully reflect the effects of noise. Further- 
more, house price  differentials  can  only be identified  if  noise  is  a 
localized  phenomenon. If  noise is widespread (e.g. in large conur- 
bations) mobility may be constrained and no price differentials can 
be identified. Secondly, the method assumes that the hedonic price 
is the same for everyone. However, not only the perception of  ncise 
will  differ between individuals but also their valuations. So what is 
measured is a mixture of  different functions with  a number of  un- 
known biases. Because of  this the exact meaning of  the hedonic pri- 
ce is not known. Thirdly, it  is  assumed that the individual's valua- 
tion of  noise is independent of  his overall level of  utility. This may 
not always be the case. 
There are also  a number of  practical  problems  associated  with 
hedonic pricing.  In order to get  good  results,  one must  take  into 
account  all  explanatory variables of  housing prices. But  the inclu- 
sion  of  too many  explanatory variables will  raise the difficult  pro- 
blem of  multicollinearity. Secondly, the unit price of  noise is taken 
as independent of  the noise level, which is probably not supported in  reality. The cost of  noise is likely to be small or nil at low levels 
and increases  as  noise  levels  become  higher.  This  also  raises  the 
question of  a threshold below which no depreciation of  house values 
takes place. Nelson  (1982) and Pearce and Markandya (1989) suni- 
marize the results of  North  An~e~icail  hedonic price studies carried 
out on traffic noise. The majority of  the findings correspond with a 
housc value depreciation in the range of  0.4% to 0.5% per dB(A), 
giving  a mean of  0.4%. The results  refer  to  a standardized value 
house. This  way  one tries  to  eliminate the possibility  that higher 
priced properties may have a greater depreciation than lower priced 
ones. Traffic noise is expressed in Leq units. According to Alexandre 
and Barde (1987) as a rule of  thumb, a 0.5% house value  depre- 
ciation per dB(A) constitutes a reasonable guide and is based upon 
a s-ubstantiai  iiiiili~,ei.  "f  st-udies. 
However, they point to the fact that it is probable that this depre- 
ciation rate is valid only above a certain noise threshold, say 50 dB(A) 
Leq, since most surveys show a very low level of  annoyance below 
this level. Furthermore they mention the possibility that the unit per- 
centage of  depreciation increases both with the noise level and with 
the value of  the house. 
In this paper, a standardized value  of  BF 3,000,000 is  assumed 
for  a house. It should be noted that the 0.5% house value depre- 
ciation is  valid  only for  a change in dB(A) during the rest  of  the 
lifetime of  the house. However, the effect of  an additional car-km is 
only temporary. This has to be taken into account when calculating 
the marginal external noise costs. Using an expected lifetime of  a 
house of  50 years  and a discount factor of  5%, we obtain a mone- 
tary value  of  BF 0.0996122 per  dB(A) produced by  an additional 
car-km. The results obtained in this way are summarized in Table 7. 
The absolute value of  the marginal external noise  costs is  small in 
all cases. The results confirm the remark that it is possible that the 
indirect effect more than offsets the direct effect. In those cases, the 
overall effect is negative. 
C. Marginal  accident costs 
1. Introduction 
In the theoretical model it was shown that there may be three dif- 
ferent categories of  marginal accident externalities associated with New trafi~c  flow 
ln~tral  speed (kmih) 
New speed (kmih) 
Distance from infrastructure (m) a. The marginal  accident costs associated with the risk of  death 
or injury to the occupants of  the additional passenger car 
If  an additional car-km is  driven, the driver and the passengers of 
the car face the risk that they themselves may be killed or seriously 
injured. A proportion of  these marginal costs is covered by the insu- 
rance premium and thus is private. But part of  it is also imposed on 
others. Indeed, society will bear the police and ambulance costs and 
looses part or the total of  the person's  net  contribution  to current 
and future output7. Formally, one obtains : 
where 
the externality  associated with the risk of  the driver or a pas- 
senger of  the additional car being killed (i=  f) or seriously inju- 
red  (i =  S) in  an accident 
p,": probability  that an occupant of  a passenger  car is killed  (i=f) 
or seriously injured  (i= S) in  an accident 
X,: estimate of  output loss, police and medical costs associated with 
a road fatality  (i =  f) or a serious injury (i =  S) 
C :  discounted present value of  the dead person's future consump- 
tion 
C'  : discounted  present value  of  the reduction  in  future consump- 
tion by  the seriously injured person 
For our empirical analysis the probabilities p,d are derived  on the 
basis of  NIS (1989) and on the basis of  an estimate of  total distance 
travelled by  passenger cars given by  Cuypers (1992). pfd  and p,d  are 
found to be  1.69 X  10-%nd  1.51 X  10.~  respectively. The value of 
(X+-C)  is  assumed to be BF 5,490,000. The average value of  X,  is 
taken to be BF 2,190,000 (Jones-Lee (1990)). C'  is  assumed to be 
zero. 
b.  Marginal accident costs associated with the increased risk of 
death, injury or material damage to the other motorized road 
users 
This category  of  marginal accident costs will  only exist if  an addi- 
tional car-km changes the probability that other motorized road users are involved  in  different types of  accidents. As was  shown in  the 
theoretical model, the additional car-km may influence these proba- 
bilities in several ways : directly and through its effect on speed and 
traffic composition. Whether the probabilities really change and - if 
they  do -  by  how  much,  is  an  issue  which  can  only  be  solved by 
identifying the relationship between accident rates and traffic flow. 
In the literature various assumptions are made concerning this rela- 
tionship. In  this paper we  consider two different views which have 
been put forward. 
Newbery (1988) uses a marginal to average accident rate ratio of 
1.25. This entails that a quartcr of  the costs of  mutually caused acci- 
dents is external. In that case, even if  insurance completely compen- 
sates the accident victims, there is still an externality equal to a quar- 
ter af  the average costs =f  mutually caused accidents. For~na!!~~  J  the 
marginal accident  externality  associated with  the increased risk of 
death, serious injury or material  damage to other motorized  road 
users (Et) can then be expressed  as: 
where 
pit:  risk of  a fatality (i =  f), serious injury (i= S) or material dama- 
ge (i =  m) in a mutually caused accident 
W,:  the value of  a statistical life 
W,:  the value of  avoidance of  a statistical serious injury 
W,:  average material damage 
On the basis of NIS (1989) the accident risks can be computed. The 
risk of  a fatality p,'  is found to be 8.6 X  10-~,  the risk of  a serious 
injury p,'  is 1.1  X  10  and the risk of  material damage p,,'  is 4.4 X 
10.~.  W,  is calculated on the basis of  Dubus (1986). The derivation 
of  W, and W,  will be discussed in section III.C.2. 
A different assumption is made by  Jones-Lee (1990). He assumes 
that the number of  accidents per car-km and traffic flow are inde- 
pendent. This view  is  supported by  the findings  of  Vitaliano  and 
Held (1991). Their analysis of  empirical evidence for urban and ru- 
ral roads in New York State (USA) shows that the volume of  road 
accidents is proportional to the volume of  traffic. A similar position 
is taken by  the UK Department of  Transport (1987) in its COBA 9 - manual and by the US Federal Highway Administration (1982). A 
possible explanation for a marginal to average accident rate ratio of 
1  could be "risk-compensation": road users choose a certain level of 
perceived  risk with which they are comfortable. A deterioration of 
travel conditions, due to e.g. heavier traffic, induces more caution 
and does not increase the probability of  an accident. 
Under the assumption of  a marginal to average accident rate ra- 
tio of  l,  there exists no marginal accident externality associated with 
the increased risk to other motorized  road users. 
c. Marginal accident costs associated with  the increased risk of 
death or injury to pedestrians and cyclists 
When a driver takes a vehicle on the road, he imposes the risk that 
he may kill or injure a pedestrian  01-  a cyclist. This marginal acci- 
dent cost should be included in external costs if  insurance does not 
01-  does not conlpletely cover the costs of  these accidents to pedes- 
trians or cyclists. Define E,"  and E,"  as  the externalities with  the 
risks  of  death and serious  injury imposed by  car  drivers  on other 
road users. The sum of  these two externalities can be expressed as 
where 
p,: probability that the car driver kills a pedestrian or a cyclist in an 
accident 
p,: probability that the car driver seriously injures a pedestrian or a 
cyclist in an accident 
For traffic on highways, p, and p, are assumed to be zero. For urban 
and other roads the calculation of  p,  and p,  is based on NIS (1989). 
They are found to be 6.65 x 10-%and  5.12 X  10~~espectively. 
For all the categories of  marginal external accident costs, a central 
input is the value of  a statistical life and the value of  avoidance of 
a statistical serious injury. 
2. The value of  transport safety 
One can distinguish different approaches for the definition and esti- 
mation of  values of  safety. The most  interesting one is the willing- ness-to-pay (WTP) approach, which is based upon the economic li- 
terature (Drkze (1962), Schelling (1968), Mishan  (1971), Jones-Lee 
(1976), Bergstrom  (1982)). It lies within  the tradition  of  welfarist 
consequentialism  and is based upon the ex-ante assessment of  un- 
certain consequences. The approach does not deal with certain deaths 
but uses  the concept  of  statistical death or injury.  It  attempts to 
determine the amounts that those who  are affected, would  indivi- 
dually be willing  to pay  for  typically small improvements  in  their 
own and others' safety. These amounts are then aggregated  across 
all individuals to arrive at an overall value for the safety improve- 
ment concerned. Jones-Lee (1976) has shown that if  (a) the safety 
improvement entails a reduction in the expected number of  fatali- 
ties of  precisely one, (b) individual probability reductions are small,  .  .  (C)  thc affcctcd group is no:  s~gn~ficantly  atjpical ir, terms of  ince- 
me, age, attitudes to risk  etc., then the value of  statistical life for 
such a safety improvement will be independent of  the precise size of 
the affected group and the precise pattern of  individual risk reduc- 
tions. 
Safety improvements  also  have  direct economic effects. To the 
extent that people  do not take this into account in  assessing their 
WTP for improved safety, values of  statistical life and safety should 
be increased by  an allowance for these factors. 
The application of  the WTP approach requires empirical estimates 
of the MRS of  wealth for risk of  death or injury. These can be obtai- 
ned in two ways : from revealed preference (RP) or from stated pre- 
ference (SP) informations.  The RP approach tries  to identify and 
observe choices in situations in which people actually trade off wealth 
or income for physical risk. 
The advantage is  that it  deals with  actual choices. However the 
method also has a number of  disadvantages. First of  all, pure wealth1 
risk trade-offs are rare. One usually has to disentangle the effects of 
other factors. Secondly, for situations in which wealthlrisk trade-offs 
are readily identifiable, somewhat biased samples of  individuals can 
be expected. The main variant  of  the approach is  formed  by  the 
hedonic wage risk studies which  analyze wage differentials  for ha- 
zardous occupations9. They  are an application of  the hedonic  ap- 
proach to the valuation  of  benefits. The wage  rate paid for  a job 
reflects forces of  supply and demand on the labour market. Howe- 
ver, what is  supplied and demanded is determined by  the job  cha- 
racteristics or attributes. One of  these attributes is  safety, so if  the market functions freely one would expect, ceteris paribus, that em- 
ployees want higher wages to compensate for higher  risk  and em- 
ployers want to see lower wages to compensate for expenditure on 
higher safety. This leads to a bargaining process resulting in a price 
for safety. This price  is called the hedonic wage. The approach is 
based on the assumption that (a) the labour market operates freely 
and is in  equilibrium and that (h) workers actually perceive work- 
place  safety risks  correctly. If  the first  assumption  is violated, the 
estimated valuation  can be biased. The violation of  the second  as- 
sumption presents a large number of  problems. If  the workplace sa- 
fety risks are misperceived  in a random way, the standard errors of 
the estimated wage-risk premium will  increase. But only if  there is 
some systematic pattern in the misperceptions, the estimate will be 
1^:---_l  TL'  --- 
UI~XU. 11 GILI~CIIU~GGS  cl~~;  not  a-ware of  the risks,  a wage  premium 
might  not exist  and one might wrongly conclude that the price of 
the risk is zero. If  there is awareness of  the risk, the problem arises 
of  whether true and perceived risk coincide. Due to data limitations 
an additional problem may  arise  (Pearce and Markandya  (1989)). 
Very often the risk variable used in hedonic wage risk studies only 
includes the risk  of  fatal accidents  and a comparable variable  for 
nonfatal accidents and illnesses is  not included. In those cases the 
coefficients obtained for the risk of fatal accidents may pick up some 
of  the compensating differential for nonfatal accidents and illnesses 
(Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982)). 
The SIP  approach10  consists of  asking a sample of  people more or 
less  directly  about their willingness to pay  for improved  safety or 
required compensation for increased risk. Its advantage is that the 
researcher can tailor his survey instrument and sampling procedure 
to provide precisely the kind of  information he requires. However it 
suffers from the disadvantage that it deals with hypothetical rather 
than actual choices. 
In this paper we will use a value of  statistical life of BF 42,000,000 
proposed by  Jones-Lee (1990). This value was obtained using esti- 
mates based on median1'  responses to different SP studies. More- 
over, Jones-Lee et al. (1985) observed in their SP study that a "sub- 
stantial majority of respondents appear not to have taken account of 
the 'direct'  economic effects  of  a safety improvement". Therefore 
the value of  statistical life should be increased by  police and medi- 
cal  costs as well  as by  net  output losses. This  amounts to a total 
value of  statistical life of  BF 47,490,000. The studies reviewed up to now do not say anything of  the value 
of  avoidance of  a statistical serious injury. This value was derived by 
means of  a stated preference study by  O'Reilly et al. (1992). They 
find a ratio of  the marginal rate of  substitution of  wealth for risk of 
serious injury to the marginal rate of  substitution of  wealth for risk 
of  death of  the value of  0.1 17. This ratio must be multiplied by  the 
value of  statistical dcath (excl. of  police and medical costs and excl. 
of  net output losses) to obtain the value of  avoidance of  statistical 
serious injury. To this figure should be added the net output losses, 
police and medical  costs associated with a serious injury. 
3. Results 
Table 8 summarizes the results of  the calculation of  the marginal 
external accident costs of  car use. Separate values are presented for 
urban and other roads on the one l-land and highways on the other 
hand. Due to a lack of  data the values could not be differentiated 
according to level of  congestion. Case 1 presents the results under 
the assumption that the marginal to average accident rate ratio equals 
1. Marginal  accident  externalities  are then  BF  1.1 in  the case  of 
urban and 'other'  roads and BF 0.4 on highways. In case 2 a mar- 
ginal to average accident rate ratio of  1.25 is assumed, which increa- 
ses the values to resp. BF 1.5 and BF 0.8". 
D. The total rnal~ginal  external costs of  car use 
Adding the marginal external congestion cost (MECC), marginal en- 
vironmental cost (MEEC) and marginal accident externalities (MEAC), 
one obtains the total  short-run marginal  external cost  of  an addi- 
tional car-km. For the nine cases considered in the empirical exer- 
cise, FIGURE 1 presents the total marginal externality if  the addi- 
tional  car-km is  driven  by  an average car  of  1989 and under  the 
assumption  that the marginal to average accident rate ratio equals 
1. Table 9 gives more information on the contribution of  the diffe- 
rent cost categories. In the interpretation of  Figure 1 and Table 10 
the assumptions made to derive the results have to be borne in mind. 
The results show that it is impossible to speak of  'the' marginal ex- 
ternal cost of  car use. The marginal external cost will vary according 
to road type, level of  congestion, traffic composition and a number 
of  other factors which  were pointed  out  in  the previous  sections. 
The marginal external costs range between BF 1.1 for uncongested TABLE 8 
The mar.gmal extenzal accident costs of  cur use 
highways and BF 77 for heavily congested highways. In uncongested 
or lightly congested conditions on highways, the main contribution 
is formed by  MEEC. On 'other' roads MEAC are the main contri- 
butors in these traffic conditions. In the case of  medium and heavy 
congestion MEEC and MEAC become less important for both road 
types and the main contribution is made by  MECC. For heavily con- 
gested traffic on highways the contribution  of  MECC increases up 
to 98%. On urban roads MECC already make a considerable contri- 
bution  to total marginal external costs during the off-peak period. 
But also in this case they become more important as congestion le- 
vels increase. The contribution of MEEC cannot generally be said 
to be unimportant. For uncongested traffic they are responsible for 
a considerable part of  marginal external costs. However, as the level 
of  congestion increases, their relative importance diminishes. CITY  HIGHWAY  HIGHWAY  HIGHWAY  HIGHWAY  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER 
OFF-PEAK  PEAK  I  Cm 
NO  LIGHT  MEDIUM  HEAVY  NO  LIGHT  HEAVY 
CONGESTION  CONGESTION  CONGESTION  CONGESTION  CONGESTION  CONGESTION  CONGESTION I  g 
0.737  0.681  0.638  0.595  0.350  1.207  0.596  0.513 
Air  0.597  0  756  0.632  0.593  0.369  1.249  0.493  0.486 
Noise  MEEc  I  0.140  -0.075  0.006  0.002  -0.018  -0.042  0.103  0.027 
M;:  1 
Operating 
TOTAL  4.350  14.551  1.062  1.331  14.122  7Jr.273  1.699  2.183 
BFICar-km) 
CONTRIBUTION  m  2 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
MEAC  25.36%  7.58%  39.87%  31.80%  3.00%  08.55%  64.94%  50.55%  18.30% 
MEEC  16.94%  4.6896  60.1396  44.6Wo  2.48%  1.56%  35.0696  23.5236  8.61% 
MECC  57.70%  87.74%  0.001  23.51%  94  52% 
Nate: 
MEAC: margin4 external ecddem msts - MEEC: marginal external environmental  msts - MECC: margin4 snernai mngesUon msts value for the marginal external costs of  car use in Belgium. The re- 
sults can be considered as a first approximation of  the external costs 
to society associated with  an additional car lulometre.  In order to 
obtain more  accurate estimates, an improvement  of  the statistical 
information on car use in Belgium is necessary. 
If  one wants to use the results for the determination of  the price 
which should be paid by  car users, a number of  remarks need to be 
taken into account. As was pointed out repeatedly in the analysis, 
the results  are valid  only for the specific  traffic conditions  consi- 
dered. The marginal external costs are a function of  different varia- 
bles  which were  discussed in  the previous  sections. One of  these 
variables is traffic volume. When determining the correct charge to 
car users one should therefore look at the equilibrium marginal ex- 
ternal c~sts,  i.e. thme CGS~S  which currespar,:!  with equilibrium traf- 
fic. Secondly, it must be noted that the marginal external costs should 
be added to the marginal private user costs exclusive of  taxation or 
excises. Or, alternatively, they should be compared with  the taxes 
and excises per ltilometre which are paid by  car users. Finally, it is 
important to mention that the existence of  marginal external costs 
should not necessarily  or solely lead  to additional  taxation  of  car 
use. Other instruments could  also be considered. For instance,  in 
the case of  air pollution  the government could  decide to impose a 
certain technology rather than using taxation as an instrument. This 
would  reduce  the marginal  external environmental  costs  and thus 
would alter the price charged to the car user. 
NOTES 
1. The research reported  in  this  paper has been conducted  under contract TRlC81019 
(promotor S.Proost) of  the National Impulse Programme Transport and Mobility ini- 
tiated  by  the Belgian State -  Prime Minister's  Service -  Science Policy  Office. The 
scientific responsability  is assumed by  its author. 
2. based on NIS (1990) 
3. In the long-run people will adjust their behaviour, which will modify the magnitude of 
the congestion  cost. As is put forward by  Newbery  (1987)  the relationship between 
the long-run  and  the short-run marginal congestion costs is given by: 
where  c  is  the elasticity of  demand for trips and c is the private cost of  travel. 
4. For  a discussion of  the sources and effects  of  air and noise pollution  by  passenger 
cars, I refer to Buna (1987), Lassikre (1976), Linster (1990), Nelson (1987) and OECD 
(1986). 
5.  The inclusion in the analysis of the emissions of particulate matter would increase the 
marginal external costs associated with  diesel cars. FIGURE 1 
The total short-run margnal exteinal costs  of  an additional car-km 
(BF 1989 per  car-km) 
MEAC  ........................... .77,2733 
MEEC 
MECC 
.......................................  L 
MEAC : Marginal external  accident costs 
MEEC : Marginal external  environmental  casts 
MECC  : Marglnal external  congestion  costs 
6. L,,,  the energy mean sound level, is a noise index used by  various countries. It gives 
the average sound level over a given period  e.g. a full day (Lassiere (1976)). 
7. According to Jones-Lee (1990) this figure should be augmented by  an allowance for 
the pain, grief and suffering experienced by  the relatives and friends of  the car occu- 
pants. Findings by  Needleman  (1976)  and Jones-Lee  et al.  (1985)  suggest that this 
allowance should consist of  50% of  willingness-to-pay  (WTP) for own safety. Howe- 
ver, one might argue against this procedure that road users, when deciding to make a 
trip, already take into account the psychological effects on relatives  and friends of  a 
possible  accident, exactly  because  they  are relatives and friends. This argument was 
put forward by  Newbery  (1987)  and an anonymous referee. 
8. An overview  of  different RP aud SP studies is given by  Jones-Lee (1987) and Jones- 
Lee (1990). 
9. See e.g. Thaler and Rosen (1973), Viscusi (1978), Brown (1980). Marin and Psacharo- 
poulos (1982). 
10. Important studies in the field of  transport safety are Jones-Lee et al. (1985), Persson 
(1989) and Maier et al. (1989). 
11. Arguments in  favour of  using median  rather than mean valuations are presented in 
Jones-Lee (1990). 
12. If, in  addition, it is assumed that the additional car user does not take into account 
the psychological effects of  an accident on his relatives and friends, the total values 
obtained must be increased by  BF 0.7. REFERENCES 
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